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Abstract
How can one determine whether a community-level treatment, such as the introduction
of a social program or trade shock, alters agents’ incentives to form links in a network?
This paper proposes analogues of a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, widely used
in the literature to test the null hypothesis of “no treatment effects,” for network data.
It first specifies a testing problem in which the null hypothesis is that two networks are
drawn from the same random graph model. It then describes two randomization tests
based on the magnitude of the difference between the networks’ adjacency matrices as
measured by the 2→ 2 and ∞→ 1 operator norms. Power properties of the tests are
examined analytically, in simulation, and through two real-world applications. A key
finding is that the test based on the ∞→ 1 norm can be substantially more powerful
than that based on the 2 → 2 norm for the kinds of sparse and degree-heterogeneous
networks common in economics.
1 Introduction
Researchers collect network data to learn about the agent interactions driving many economic
phenomena. This is often done by first drawing a sample of agents and then surveying pairs of
agents about potential relationships. For instance, to understand how information about new
technologies and social programs diffuse within a village, researchers might survey villagers
about sources of loans or advice (see for instance Conley and Udry 2010; Banerjee et al. 2013;
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Beaman et al. 2018). To learn about the social interactions driving scholastic achievement
in a school, researchers might ask students about their friends or classmates (see for instance
Bramoulle´ et al. 2009; Calvo´-Armengol et al. 2009; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens 2013).
When the data are collected via social survey, it is rare to think that these reported
relationships record all of the relevant interactions between agents. Instead, the reported
relationships are likely also influenced by completely unrelated features of the data collec-
tion process. For example, agents may overreport relationships corresponding to recent but
otherwise irrelevant interactions, survey enumerators may have heterogeneous beliefs about
what interactions constitute a particular relationship, or researchers may incorrectly match
reported names to agents in the sample. The implication of this idiosyncratic variation is
that were the researcher to return and resurvey the agents on a different day, or use a slightly
different survey methodology, the reported relationships could change substantially even if
the underlying interactions between agents that drive the phenomena of interest have not.
A common solution to this problem is to model the reported relationships as random
variables. However, treating network data as stochastic complicates their analysis because it
is not immediately clear which features of the data are informative about actual interactions
between agents and which are merely a coincidence of idiosyncratic variation. For instance,
to evaluate the impact of a social policy on agents’ incentives to form economic relationships,
researchers might survey agents before and after the policy is implemented and compare the
observed configurations of relationships (see recently Comola and Prina 2015; Banerjee et al.
2016; 2017; Heß et al. 2018). But when the data are stochastic, a skeptical researcher may be
concerned that all of the observed changes in the network can be explained by idiosyncratic
features of the data collection process and are unrelated to the change in policy. That is,
the observed differences between the networks are statistically insignificant.1
How can one determine whether the realized differences between two stochastic networks
are statistically significant? To address the question, this paper considers a testing problem
in which the null hypothesis is that two networks are drawn from the same random graph
model. That is, the underlying propensity for agents to report links is the same even if the
1Significance tests are sometimes misused in the social sciences. For instance, they may be incorrectly
interpreted as all-purpose indicators of scientific relevance rather than a statement about a specific statistical
hypothesis (see Abadie 2018; Andrews and Kasy 2017; Ziliak and McCloskey 2008, for recent discussions).
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configurations of relationships observed by the researcher are nominally different.
How should one measure differences between stochastic networks in practice? A common
way to evaluate the hypothesis of “no treatment effects” when a treatment and control are
each associated with a random vector of outcomes is to compare their empirical distribution
functions (see generally Imbens and Rubin 2015; Abadie and Cattaneo 2018). A justification
for this approach is that the empirical distribution function is sensitive to a large class of
potential differences between random vectors. This paper proposes an analogous use of
operator norms to measure differences between stochastic networks. A key contribution of
this paper is to motivate and justify the proposal.
1.1 Outline
Section 2 describes a model and testing problem. The model is based on various dyadic fixed
effects regression models popular in the econometrics literature (see recently Dzemski 2014;
Candelaria 2016; Charbonneau 2017; Graham 2017; Jochmans 2017; Toth 2017; Verdier 2017;
Jochmans and Weidner 2019; Gao 2019). The null hypothesis is that two networks are drawn
from the same model. Potential applications include tests of the hypothesis of no treatment
effects, tests of common assumptions in the network economics literature such as network
stationarity, the non-existence of network externalities, and link reciprocity/undirectedness,
detecting breaks in dynamic network structure, and assessing model goodness-of-fit.
Section 3 outlines a randomization test. The test is based on an implication of the model,
that under the null hypothesis the joint distribution of links is invariant to exchanging the
weight of a link in one network for its identically indexed counterpart in the other. It
requires the researcher to choose a measure of discrepancy between the networks. That is, a
test statistic. Any collection of network statistics can be used to construct the test statistic.
Example test statistics include the mean absolute difference in the degree distributions,
eigenvector centralities, or clustering coefficients of the two networks. Economic theory will
sometimes determine exactly which test statistic should be used.
In many cases, however, the researcher might not know which test statistic to use. Limit-
ing attention to an arbitrary statistic may cause the researcher to ignore potentially relevant
information in the data contrary to the null hypothesis; considering too many test statistics
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may result in a multiple comparisons problem. To guard against these possibilities, Section
4 considers two test statistics that produce tests powerful against a large class of alternative
hypotheses. The first test statistic is based on the 2→ 2 operator norm (also known as the
spectral norm) of the entry-wise difference between the networks’ adjacency matrices. The
second test statistic is based on the ∞→ 1 operator norm (closely related to the cut norm
of Frieze and Kannan 1999) of the entry-wise difference between the networks’ adjacency
matrices.2 Intuitively, these norms are matrix analogues of the empirical distribution func-
tion statistics (for example, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Crame´r-von Mises test statistics)
commonly used to measure differences between random vectors, see Section 4.1.
Section 4.2 describes some power properties of the two tests using concentration results
from the random matrix theory literature. It provides a class of sequences of alternative
hypotheses (in which the dimensions of the adjacency matrices tend towards infinity) such
that the tests are consistent: the probability of (correctly) rejecting the null hypothesis when
it is false approaches one uniformly over this class. When the networks are weighted, the
results do not require restrictions on the weights, which to my knowledge is new.
If the tests based on the 2 → 2 and ∞ → 1 norms had similar power properties, then
the former might be preferred in practice because the 2 → 2 norm is straightforward to
compute, while even approximating the ∞→ 1 norm up to a constant factor requires tools
from the semidefinite programming literature. However, a key contribution of this paper is to
demonstrate that the latter test can be considerably more powerful for alternatives in which
there is nontrivial heterogeneity in the row-variances of the networks’ adjacency matrices.
Such row-heteroskedasticity may occur when the networks are sparse or have heavy-tailed
degree distributions. Both features are defining characteristics of many social and economic
networks (see generally Jackson 2008, Chapter 3).
Intuitively, the 2→ 2 norm may have low power under row-heteroskedasticity because the
weight vector that maximizes this norm places most of its weight on the entries corresponding
to the rows of the adjacency matrices with the highest variances. The test thus potentially
ignores differences between the two networks that occur in the low-variance rows. The∞→ 1
2For positive integers p and q, the p→ q operator norm of a matrix is the largest product of the matrix
and a unit weight vector. The magnitude of the product is measured using the q-vector norm. The magnitude
of the weight vector is measured using the p-vector norm (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, Chapter 6).
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norm addresses the problem by using the ∞-vector norm instead of the 2-vector norm to
define the unit weight vector. The entries of the weight vector that maximize this norm take
values in {−1, 1} and thus by definition necessarily place the same absolute weight on every
entry. Consequently, if there are sufficiently large differences between the two networks
in the low-variance rows, the test based on the ∞ → 1 norm will detect them. In some
sense, this logic behind the ∞-vector norm is related to that behind the 1 or 0-vector norm
penalizations common in the high-dimensional regression literature. Instead of imposing a
sparse solution, however, the ∞-vector norm imposes a dense one.
Related tests for network data have been proposed in the computer science and statistics
literatures. Ghoshdastidar et al. (2017a;b) propose a test statistic based on the 2→ 2 norm
for a different testing problem; they also rely on multiple copies of each network. A literature
on random dot product graph models (see Tang et al. 2017; Nielsen and Witten 2018) relies
on a particular low-dimensional dot-product structure that often fails to characterize social
and economic networks. Another application of randomization-based inference includes tests
for network interference (see recently Aronow 2012; Athey et al. 2018; Leung 2016; Song 2018;
Puelz et al. 2019). Rather than study the influence of a treatment on network structure,
this literature studies the influence of a network on agents’ exposure to treatment.
Section 5 concludes with two empirical demonstrations. Proofs are in an appendix.
1.2 Main methodological contributions
I highlight three main methodological contributions to the network econometrics literature.
The first contribution is the use of operator norms to measure differences in stochastic net-
work structure nonparametrically. While the idea is based on an established mathematics
literature (see generally Lova´sz 2012), to my knowledge this is the first application to net-
work inference. I do not know of other results for arbitrarily weighted and directed networks.
Analogous tests for random vectors (for example, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) are ubiqui-
tous in the social sciences.
The second contribution is to identify the problem of row-heteroskedasticity. Heterosked-
asitcity is a well-studied phenomenon in the random vector setting, but to my knowledge
this is the first paper to demonstrate how it can cause inferences based on the spectra of
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random matrices to be unreliable. The spectrum of an adjacency matrix is routinely used in
economic network theory (see for instance Golub and Jackson 2012; Bramoulle´ et al. 2014).
Researchers are advised to be careful when interpreting the spectra of adjacency matrices
when the networks are modeled as stochastic.
The third contribution is to propose the∞-norm penalty as a robust alternative to the 2-
norm when measuring differences in network structure using operator norms. It is well known
in the penalized regression literature that choosing a penalty function with a “cusp” or “kink”
at 0 can induce sparsity in the optimizing weight vector (see for instance Belloni et al. 2014).
However, this is to my knowledge the first setting in which a penalty function with a “bump”
is chosen specifically to induce density. The idea may also be useful for matrix estimation
problems in which operator norms play a central role. Examples include clustering, topic
modeling, network density estimation, and matrix completion. These problems are becoming
increasingly common in economic research.
2 Framework
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 describes a model and testing problem. Section 2.3 discusses key as-
sumptions. Section 2.3 provides examples of potential empirical applications.
2.1 Model
It is without loss to consider undirected unipartite networks. These networks are defined on a
set of N agents referred to as a community and indexed by [N ] := {1, 2, ..., N}. Every pair of
agents in a community is endowed with two real-valued random variables, each corresponding
to a stochastic social relationship. For example, one weight might correspond to whether two
agents are friends, another might give the amount of trade between them, etc. The variable
Dij,t for t = 1, 2 records the realized relationship t between agents i and j. The N × N
dimensional symmetric adjacency matrix Dt contains Dij,t in the ijth and jith entries.
Directed or bipartite networks are incorporated in the following way. These networks
are generally defined on a set of N1 agents and N2 markets indexed by [N1] and [N2] re-
spectively. Every agent-market pair is endowed with two real-valued random variables, each
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corresponding to a stochastic social relationship. For example, one weight might correspond
to whether the agent is employed in the market, another might give the amount of profit the
agent makes in the market, etc. The variable D⋆ij,t records the realized relationship t between
agent i and market j. The N1 ×N2 dimensional matrix D⋆t contains D⋆ij,t in the ijth entry.
This asymmetric rectangular adjacency matrix is then transformed into a symmetric square
one by setting
Dt =

0N1×N1 D⋆t
(D⋆t )
T 0N2×N2


where (·)T is the transpose operator, 0N1×N1 is an N1×N1 matrix of zeros, and Dt is a N×N
symmetric matrix with N = N1+N2. Thus the focus on undirected unipartite networks (i.e.
symmetric and square adjacency matrices) is without loss.
The entries of D1 and D2 are assumed be equal to 0 on the main diagonal (i.e, no self-
links) and mutually independent above the main diagonal. This independence assumption
is common in the network econometrics literature as discussed in more detail below. It can
also be relaxed as discussed in Section 2.3.1. The marginal distribution of Dij,t is denoted by
Fij,t and the N ×N dimensional matrix Ft contains Fij,t in the ijth entry. A generic matrix
of distribution functions Ft is referred to as a random graph model.
A concrete example of a random graph model is
Dij,t = ft(αi,t, αj,t, wij,t) + εij,t
where αi,t is an agent-specific effect, wij,t are agent-pair attributes, ft is a community link
function, and εij,t is an error that is independently distributed across agent-pairs with
marginal distribution Gij,t (see for example Dzemski 2014; Candelaria 2016; Charbonneau
2017; Graham 2017; Jochmans 2017; Toth 2017; Verdier 2017; Jochmans and Weidner 2019;
Gao 2019). Importantly, the framework of this paper treats the effects {αi,t}i∈[N ],t∈[2] and
attributes {wij,t}i,j∈[N ],t∈[2] as non-stochastic. That is, if these variables are thought to be
drawn from some joint distribution, then the random graph model is defined conditional
on their realization. This modeling strategy of conditioning on the fixed effects and at-
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tributes follows exactly the cited literature (see in particular Graham 2019, Section 6.3 for
a discussion).
The only remaining source of randomness are the {εij,t}i∈[N ],t∈[2] and so the {Dij,t}i,j∈[N ],t∈[2]
are independent random variables with marginals given by Fij,t(s) = Gij,t(s−ft(αi,t, αj,t, wij,t)).
The random graph model Ft is thus parametrized by the agent-specific effects, agent-pair
attributes, community link function, and distribution of idiosyncratic errors. Informally, if
a treatment alters any of these parameters, then the framework characterizes the change as
a “treatment effect.3” This is formalized by the statement of the testing problem below.
Other notions of a random graph model imply other definitions of a treatment effect, see
Section 2.3, but their study is left to future work.
2.2 Testing problem
The problem considered in this paper is to test the null hypothesis
H0 : Fij,1 = Fij,2 for every i, j ∈ [N ]
against the alternative
H1 : Fij,1 6= Fij,2 for some i, j ∈ [N ].
In words, H0 is the hypothesis that D1 and D2 are drawn from the same random graph
model.
This testing problem is nonstandard relative to the classic goodness-of-fit testing litera-
ture because Fij,1 and Fij,2 are allowed to vary arbitrarily across i, j ∈ [N ] under H0. That is,
the entries within an adjacency matrix are not assumed to be identically distributed. Link
heterogeneity is thought to be an indispensable feature of stochastic networks in economics
(see generally Jackson 2008, Chapter 4). Tests that fail to account for this heterogeneity
(i.e. tests that treat D1 and D2 as vectors of length N(N − 1)/2 with identically distributed
entries) are generally underpowered. A real-world example of this is the first empirical
3Not every difference in model parameters can be detected using D1 and D2. The difference between the
parameters must yield a sufficiently large difference in F1 and F2. See Section 4.2.
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demonstration of Section 5.
For the concrete example of Section 2.1, the problem is equivalent to testing the hy-
pothesis that Gij,1(s− f1(αi,1, αj,1, wij,1)) = Gij,2(s− f2(αi,2, αj,2, wij,2)) for every s ∈ R and
i, j ∈ [N ]. The hypothesis may be false whenever the two random graph models have differ-
ent agent-specific effects, agent-pair attributes, community link functions, or distribution of
idiosyncratic errors. Distinguishing between these parameters is a different testing problem
and generally requires more assumptions. For example, if the {εij,t}i∈[NT ],t∈[2] are assumed to
be identically distributed, αi,1 = αi,2, and wij,1 = wij,2 for every i, j ∈ [N ], then the problem
reduces to a test of whether the link functions f1 and f2 are the same. Alternatively, if the
{εij,t}i∈[NT ],t∈[2] are assumed to be identically distributed, f1 = f2, and wij,1 = wij,2 for every
i, j ∈ [N ], then the problem reduces to a test of whether αi,1 = αi,2 for every i ∈ [N ]. See
the discussion after Theorem 4 in Section 4.2.3 below for more details.
Thus the testing problem is specifically designed to detect differences between D1 and
D2 that are not the result of the idiosyncratic errors {εij,t}i,j∈[N ],t∈[2]. The logic behind this
test is that any change in the distribution of idiosyncratic errors, agent fixed effects, linking
function, etc. reflects different incentives for agents to form or report links. Differences due
to the idiosyncratic errors may only reflect measurement or misreporting error, as motivated
in the introduction. Of course, this may not be the only potentially interesting hypothesis
about the random graph models of D1 and D2. Alternative testing problems, see for example
Section 2.3, are left to future work.
2.3 Discussion of key assumptions
As discussed above, a potential drawback of the hypothesis testing framework is that the
researcher must fix a hypothesis to test. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 define one notion of what it
means for the structure of two stochastic networks to be the same. Different assumptions
correspond to different notions of network similarity. I discuss three examples, but many
others exist.
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2.3.1 Example 1: Independence assumption
The assumption that the entries of D1 and D2 are mutually independent above the main
diagonal may appear restrictive. However, it is consistent with the cited literature that
conditions on any driver of link formation that is correlated across agent-pairs and treats
it as a fixed parameter of the model (see Graham 2019, Section 6.3). The only remaining
variation satisfies the independence assumption. Intuitively, this error may represent the
types of survey or measurement error discussed in the introduction.
Alternatively, the entries of D1 and D2 may be dependent. For instance, Dij,r and Dkl.s
may be correlated if {i, j} and {k, l} share an index or are nearby in some latent space.
This is a different testing problem. Depending on how the dependence is modeled, the
randomization procedure of Section 3 may not be well-suited for this problem. A test might
instead be constructed by choosing a test statistic that concentrates under the null hypothesis
and using asymptotic approximations or large deviation inequalities to construct a critical
value. This strategy can be applied to the operator norm statistics of Section 4 for a wide
variety of dependence structures (see for example Vershynin 2010). Since the incorporation
of dependence is unrelated to the main idea of this paper to measure network structure
nonparametrically, I leave this extension to future work.
2.3.2 Example 2: Same communities assumption
The framework of this paper does not need the indices of D1 and D2 to refer to literally
the exact same set of agents. Rather what is required is that the researcher can specify a
correspondence from one community to the other such that the links between corresponding
agents are comparable. For instance, if the researcher observes two networks connecting two
distinct communities of students, the researcher might define two students to be comparable
if they have the same GPA, extra-curricular activities, and class schedule. Let the vector
xi,t characterize the GPA, extra-curricular activities, and class schedule of student i in com-
munity t, [N1] index the first community of students, and [N2] index the second community.
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Then it is straightforward to extend the framework to test
Hb0 : Fij,1 = Fkl,2 for every i, j ∈ [N1], k, l ∈ [N2] such that (xi,1, xj,1) = (xk,2, xl,2)
against the alternative
Hb1 : Fij,1 6= Fkl,2 for some i, j ∈ [N ], k, l ∈ [N2] such that (xi,1, xj,1) = (xk,2, xl,2).
A potentially interesting complication arises when the agent characteristics used for the
comparisons {xi,t}i∈[Nt],t∈[2] are either unobserved or only partially observed. While the
results of this paper can be extended by considering every possible comparison that is con-
sistent with the observed data and combining the tests in the usual way, the resulting test
may be underpowered in practice.
2.3.3 Example 3: Sharp null hypothesis
The problem considered in this paper is a test of the sharp null hypothesis that two random
graph models agree for every agent-pair. Analogous testing problems are commonly specified
in the treatment effects literature to detect any potential difference between treatment and
control units (see generally Imbens and Rubin 2015; Abadie and Cattaneo 2018).
Sometimes the researcher is only interested in a smaller class of potential differences
between F1 and F2. For instance, the researcher may want to know if two networks have
the same distribution of average degrees or clustering coefficients. The randomization test
of Section 3 may not be well-suited for these problems. However, a test of such average
null hypotheses may often be constructed by first calculating sample analogues and then
approximating their distribution in the usual way (see Graham 2019, Section 7). The focus
of this paper on measuring differences in network structure nonparametrically using operator
norms is not generally relevant for these testing problems, and so they are not considered in
this paper.
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2.4 Example applications
I sketch three potential applications of the framework. Other examples (not discussed here)
include detecting breaks in dynamic network structure and assessing model goodness-of-fit.
2.4.1 Application 1: effect of an exogenous event
The researcher observes two networks and hypothesizes that their structure has changed
in response to an exogenous event. For example, Goyal et al. (2006) collect information
about coauthorships between economists and argue that the profession has become more
interconnected in response to new research technologies such as the internet. Fowler (2006)
studies bill cosponsorships in the US Senate and argues that the body has become more
partisan after the election of the 104th congress. Banerjee et al. (2016) survey villagers
before and after the introduction of a microfinance program and posit that the program
has disincentivized certain types of economic relationships. A skeptical researcher may be
concerned that while the observed networks are nominally different, they correspond to the
same underlying patterns of interactions between agents as described by a random graph
model. The first demonstration in Section 5 is based on this application.
2.4.2 Application 2: influence of research design
The researcher makes seemingly arbitrary decisions about data collection and processing
that influences exactly which relationships between agents are observed. Here “seemingly
arbitrary” refers to decisions that are not exactly determined by economic theory. For ex-
ample, to understand how information diffuses in a village, it may not be clear whether the
researcher should survey agents about their social connections, economic connections, previ-
ous conversations about similar information, potential future conversations about different
information, etc. (see for instance Conley and Udry 2010; Banerjee et al. 2013; Beaman
et al. 2018). To study social interactions amongst high school students, it is common to
collect data by asking students to list their friends, but researchers often assume that any
nomination of one agent by another indicates a social relationship between both agents (see
for instance Bramoulle´ et al. 2009; Calvo´-Armengol et al. 2009; Goldsmith-Pinkham and
12
Imbens 2013). Reciprocity of social relationships has important implications for the magni-
tude of peer effects, predictions about who is the “key player,” and more (see Comola and
Fafchamps 2014).4 The second demonstration in Section 5 is based on this application.
2.4.3 Application 3: network externalities
The researcher posits that the observed network is generated by a model with externali-
ties. Network externalities here refer to models in which the existence of a link between
two agents depends on other links realized in the network (see for instance Sheng 2012;
de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer 2014; Leung 2015; Menzel 2015; Ridder and Sheng
2015; de Paula 2016; Griffith 2016; Badev 2017; Boucher and Mourifie´ 2017; Mele 2017; Mele
and Zhu 2017; Gualdani 2017; Leung 2019). The model also allows links to be explained
by idiosyncratic variation, and the researcher would like to test the null hypothesis that the
observed configuration of network links can be explained solely by this variation. That is,
test for the existence of network externalities.
The test requires two networks. Two networks are necessary because there are no testable
implications of network externalities with only a single network in this setting. One can
potentially use networks defined on different communities as in Section 2.3, Example 2. I
illustrate the application with the following model motivated by Bloch and Jackson (2007)
(see Graham 2015, Section 2)
Dij,t = 1
{
αij + γij
N∑
k=1
Dik,tDjk,t − εij,t ≥ 0
}
where εij,t is independent, identically distributed, and mean-zero. The parameters αij and
γij do not vary with t. In this model, agents with many friends in common are more likely
to become friends, and the agents first draw {εij,t}i 6=j and then choose links so that the link
formation rule is satisfied for every ij-pair.
The goal of the researcher is to test the null hypothesis
Hc0 : γij = 0 for every i, j ∈ [N ]
4I thank Vincent Boucher for suggesting this example.
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against the alternative
Hc1 : γij 6= 0 for some i, j ∈ [N ].
Under Hc0, D1 and D2 are drawn from the same random graph model (in the sense of Section
2.1), thus the randomization test proposed in Section 3 controls size in finite samples. I do
not study the power properties of this test for network externalities in this paper.
3 Randomization procedure
I outline a randomization procedure to construct tests for the problem of Section 2 (see
Lehmann and Romano 2006, Chapter 15). The procedure takes as given a test statistic
T (D1, D2). Any real-valued function of D1 and D2 can be used to construct the test statistic.
Economic theory sometimes suggests a particular test statistic. For example, in the
network peer effects literature, differences in agent behavior are thought to be driven by a
collection of average peer outcomes and characteristics. In the information diffusion liter-
ature, differences in the spread of information are thought to be driven by a collection of
centrality statistics such as degree, eigenvector, or diffusion centrality. If C(D1) denotes a
vector of agent-specific peer characteristics or centrality measures evaluated on D1, then a
potential test statistic is the root-mean-squared difference between C(D1) and C(D2). That
is, T (D1, D2) = ||C(D1)− C(D2)||2, where || · ||2 is the vector 2-norm.
Once the researcher has selected a test statistic, the randomization procedure constructs a
test forH0 in the following way. For any positive integer R, let {ρrij}i>j∈[N ],r∈[R] be a collection
of
(
N
2
)×R independent Bernoulli random variables with mean 1/2. Define ρrij = ρrji if i < j.
Then for each r ∈ [R], the randomized N ×N adjacency matrices Dr1 and Dr2 are generated
by exchanging Dij,1 and Dij,2 whenever ρ
r
ij equals 1. That is,
Drij,1 = Dij,1ρ
r
ij +Dij,2(1− ρrij)
Drij,2 = Dij,1(1− ρrij) +Dij,2ρrij
where Drij,1 is the ijth entry of D
r
1. For any α ∈ [0, 1], the proposed α-sized test based on
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T (D1, D2) rejects H0 if
(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1 {T (Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T (D1, D2)}

 ≤ α
and fails to reject H0 otherwise.
Since (D1, D2) and (D
r
1, D
r
2) have the same distribution under H0, Lehmann and Romano
(2006), Theorem 15.2.1 implies the following. WhenH0 is true the probability of a (incorrect)
rejection does not exceed α, or
P

(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1 {T (Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T (D1, D2)}

 ≤ α|H0 is true

 ≤ α.
This is true for any test statistic T (D1, D2).
5 When the researcher has a collection of different
network statistics, the researcher can combine them into one test statistic, or combine the
tests in the usual way. One can also test whether any number of adjacency matrices are
drawn from the same random graph model by permuting all of the corresponding entries.
4 Two test statistics based on operator norms
Two test statistics based on operator norms are proposed in Section 4.1. Some large sample
power properties of the resulting tests are characterized in Section 4.2.
4.1 Specification
The randomization procedure of Section 3 produces a test for the problem of Section 2 that
controls the probability of (incorrectly) rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true using
any test statistic. However, not every statistic produces a test that is powerful in the sense
that it tends to (correctly) reject the null hypothesis when it is false. This section proposes
two statistics that have power against a large class of alternative hypotheses. The statistics
are based on p→ q operator norms.
5The probability that this test (incorrectly) rejects the null hypothesis when it is true is less than α. One
can modify the test so that this probability is exactly α. See Lehmann and Romano (2006), Chapter 15.2.
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For any real p, q ≥ 1, the test statistic based on the p→ q operator norm is given by
Tp→q(D1, D2) = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||p=1
|| [1{D1 ≤ s} − 1{D2 ≤ s}]ϕ||q
where || · ||p refers to the vector p-norm, ϕ is a N -dimensional column vector with real-valued
entries, and for any real number s and matrix X , 1{X ≤ s} contains 1 in the ijth entry if
Xij ≤ s and 0 otherwise. The test of H0 based on Tp→q is exactly as described in Section 3.
When the entries of D1 and D2 are {0, 1}-valued,
Tp→q(D1, D2) = max
ϕ:||ϕ||p=1
|| (D1 −D2)ϕ||q
which is the p → q operator norm of the entry-wise difference between two adjacency ma-
trices. Intuitively, Tp→q (D1, D2) compares the collection of weighted degree distributions of
D1 and D2, indexed by the weight vector ϕ and given by {
∑
j∈[N ]Dij,tϕj}i∈[N ],ϕ:||ϕ||p=1. This
weighted degree distribution function can be viewed as a matrix analogue of the empirical
distribution function for vectors. Instead of measuring the number of entries that fall below
a point on the real line, however, it measures the magnitude of connections from each agent
to the set of other agents (i.e. degree), as weighted by ϕ.
Not every p → q operator norm is either computable or produces a test that has power
against a nontrivial class of alternatives in H1. I thus focus on two particular choices of p
and q.
The first test statistic is based on the 2→ 2 operator norm
T2→2(D1, D2) = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:
∑
t ϕ
2
t=1
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
[1{Dij,1 ≤ s} − 1{Dij,2 ≤ s}]ϕj


2
.
It can be computed by first fixing s ∈ R and then computing the largest spectral value of
[1{D1 ≤ s} − 1{D2 ≤ s}]. The outer maximization is then taken over the number of unique
entries in D1 and D2 which is not larger than N(N − 1).
The 2 → 2 norm is a natural first choice because it is straightforward to compute and
its statistical properties have been well studied in the random matrix theory literature (see
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generally Tao 2012). However, as I demonstrate below, the resulting test may have low
power under row-heteroskedasticity: nontrivial variation in the row-variances of the adja-
cency matrices. Intuitively, the problem is that the weight vector ϕ that maximizes the
program places excessive weight on the high-variance rows of [1{D1 ≤ s} − 1{D2 ≤ s}]. See
Section 4.2 for details. To address this problem, I consider a second test statistic.
The second test statistic is based on the ∞→ 1 operator norm
T∞→1(D1, D2) = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:maxt∈[N]|ϕt|=1
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
[1{Dij,1 ≤ s} − 1{Dij,2 ≤ s}]ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The logic behind this test statistic is that the weight vector ϕ that maximizes this prob-
lem necessarily places the same absolute weight on every entry and is thus less sensitive
to row-heteroskedasticity. Unfortunately, this norm cannot be computed to arbitrary pre-
cision except in trivial cases (see H˚astad 2001). The proposed test is instead based on the
semidefinite approximation
S∞→1(D1, D2) =
1
2
max
s∈R
max
X∈X2N
〈0N×N ∆(s)
∆(s) 0N×N

 , X
〉
where ∆(s) = 1{D1 ≤ s} − 1{D2 ≤ s}, 〈·〉 is the inner product operator (i.e. 〈X, Y 〉 =∑2N
i=1
∑2N
j=1XijYij), and X2N is the set of all 2N × 2N positive semidefinite matrices with
diagonal entries equal to 1, see Goemans and Williamson (1994); Nesterov (1998). This
statistic can be computed to arbitrary precision relatively quickly using programs available
in many statistical software packages. 6
Remarkably, T∞→1 and S∞→1 are equivalent up to a factor of 2 regardless of N . It is
6The results below use the sqlp function in the SDPT3 package for R (see Toh et al. 2012).
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relatively straightforward to show that T∞→1 ≤ S∞→1 since
T∞→1 = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||∞=1
||∆(s)ϕ||1
= max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||∞=1
max
ψ:||ψ||∞=1
〈∆(s), ϕ⊗ ψ〉
=
1
2
max
s∈R
max
φ:||φ||∞=1
〈0N×N ∆(s)
∆(s) 0N×N

 , φ⊗ φ
〉
≤ 1
2
max
s∈R
max
X∈X2N
〈0N×N ∆(s)
∆(s) 0N×N

 , X
〉
= S∞→1
where ⊗ refers to the vector outer product operator, the first equality follows from taking
ψ = sign (∆(s)ϕ), the second equality follows by choosing φ to be the concatenation of ϕ
and ψ, and the inequality follows from φ⊗ φ ∈ X2N .
Grothendieck’s inequality (see Krivine 1979; Alon and Naor 2006, as well as Appendix
A.2) directly implies a corresponding lower bound
S∞→1 ≤ pi
2 ln
(
1 +
√
2
)T∞→1 ≤ 1.783 T∞→1.
These bounds are not tight, but currently the best available. They motivate S∞→1 as a
computable alternative to T∞→1 in the proposed test of H0.
To summarize, the α-sized test based on the 2→ 2 norm rejects H0 if
(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1 {T2→2(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T2→2(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α.
The α-sized test based on the ∞→ 1 norm rejects H0 if
(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1 {S∞→1(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ S∞→1(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α.
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4.2 Some large sample power properties
As discussed in Section 3, the α-sized tests based on T2→2 and S∞→1 (incorrectly) reject the
null hypothesis when it is true with probability less than α. This section provides conditions
such that the tests (correctly) reject the null hypothesis when it is false. Specifically, it defines
a class of sequences of alternative hypotheses such that the power of the tests tend to one
uniformly over the class. Each sequence describes a collection of models and tests indexed
by N ∈ N. Each model is as described in Section 2. Each test is as described in Section
3. The parameters F1, F2, R, and α may all vary with N (subject to restrictions outlined
below). Limits are with N →∞. The results mirror those for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
provided in Chapter 14.2 of Lehmann and Romano (2006).
4.2.1 Assumptions and constructions
The assumptions of Section 2 are collected in the following statement.
Assumption 1 (Framework): The adjacency matrices D1 and D2 are N ×N symmetric
random matrices with independent upper diagonal entries and zeros on the diagonal. The
null hypothesis to be tested is
H0 : Fij,1 = Fij,2 for every i, j ∈ [N ]
where Fij,t(s) = P (Dij,t ≤ s) against the alternative
H1 : Fij,1 6= Fij,2 for some i, j ∈ [N ]. 
The following restriction on the test parameters is imposed.
Assumption 2 (Parameters):
ln(R)− ln(α)
ln(N)
= O (1) and α(R + 1) ≥ 1. 
Assumption 2 nests three basic assumptions. The first is that the number of simulations
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used to construct the randomization distribution is not exponentially large relative to the
number of agents. The second is that the size of the test is not exponentially small relative
to the number of agents. The third assumption is that the size of the test is larger than the
inverse of the number of simulations. I do not believe these assumptions to be restrictive in
practice. The first two assumptions are used to bound the reference distributions generated
by {T2→2 (Dr1, Dr2)}r∈[R] and {S∞→1 (Dr1, Dr2)}r∈[R]. See Section 4.2.4. The third assumption
is required because (R+ 1)−1
(
1 +
∑
r∈[R] 1{T (Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T (D1, D2)}
)
≥ (R+ 1)−1 by con-
struction. Thus if (R + 1)−1 > α, the test will mechanically fail to reject H0 regardless of
the choice of T or any difference between F1 and F2.
The following constructions are used.
Constructions:
∆(s) = 1{D1 ≤ s} − 1{D2 ≤ s}
νij(s) = Fij,1(s) + Fij,2(s)− 2Fij,1(s)Fij,2(s)
τ = max
s∈R
max
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
νij(s)
σ = max
s∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
νij(s)
T2→2(F1, F2) = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||2=1
|| (F1(s)− F2(s))ϕ||2
T∞→1(F1, F2) = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||∞=1
|| (F1(s)− F2(s))ϕ||1. 
In words, νij(s) is the variance of ∆ij(s),
√∑
j∈[N ] νij(s) is the root of the ith row-variance
of ∆(s), maxi∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ] νij(s) and
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ] νij(s) are the maximum and average
root-row-variance of ∆(s) respectively, and τ and σ are the maximum of the maximum
and average root-row-variances taken over s. Under H0 and certain regularity conditions,
T2→2(D1, D2) is proportional to τ and T∞→1(D1, D2) is proportional to σ with high proba-
bility. This is demonstrated by Lemmas 1 and 2 in Section 4.2.4 below.
T2→2(F1, F2) and T∞→1(F1, F2) are the two test statistics applied to the (matrix of)
distribution functions F1 and F2. These metrics quantify the extent to which H0 is violated.
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Larger values correspond to more extreme violations. Under certain regularity conditions,
T2→2(F1, F2) large relative to τ or T∞→1(F1, F2) large relative to σ eventually results in a
rejection of H0. This is the content of Theorems 1 and 2 below. The results are analogous
to Theorem 14.2.2 of Lehmann and Romano (2006) which provides sufficient conditions for
the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test to be consistent.
4.2.2 Consistency
Assumptions 1 and 2 are assumed throughout. The consistency result for the test based on
the 2→ 2 norm is given by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The power of the α-sized test that rejects H0 whenever
(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1{T2→2(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T2→2(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α
tends to one uniformly over all alternatives that satisfy T2→2(F1, F2)/τ →∞ and
τ/
√
ln(N)→∞. That is,
inf
F1,F2:T2→2(F1,F2)/τ→∞
and τ/
√
ln(N)→∞
P

(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1{T2→2(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T2→2(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α

→ 1. 
The hypothesis of Theorem 1 has two rate conditions. The first rate condition is that
T2→2(F1, F2)/τ → ∞. This condition implies that the size of the violation of H0 (as given
by T2→2(F1, F2)) exceeds the magnitude of the test statistic T2→2(D1, D2) under H0 (which
is on the order of τ) with high probability. When Ft is sufficiently dense in the sense that for
some s ∈ R, Fij,t(s) is uniformly bounded away from 0 and 1, one can show that it follows
from
√
NT2→2(F1, F2) → ∞. An analogous rate condition appears in Theorem 14.2.2 of
Lehmann and Romano (2006).
The second rate condition is that τ/
√
ln(N) → ∞. This condition implies that the
reference distribution generated by {T2→2(Dr1, Dr2)}r∈[R] concentrates below τ . It is satisfied
if Ft is sufficiently dense in the sense that, for some s ∈ R, Nln(N)Fij,t(s) and Nln(N)(1−Fij,t(s))
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are uniformly bounded away from 0. In other words, agents have on expectation at least
ln(N) connections. This suggests that the test based on the 2 → 2 norm may be poorly
suited for sparse networks in which agents have on expectation only a bounded number of
connections. See Section 4.3 below.
The consistency result for the test based on the ∞→ 1 norm is given by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: The power of the α-sized test that rejects H0 whenever
(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1{S∞→1(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ S∞→1(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α
tends to one uniformly over all alternatives that satisfy T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ →∞ and
σ/
√
ln(N)→∞. That is,
inf
F1,F2:T∞→1(F1,F2)/σ→∞
and σ/
√
ln(N)→∞
P

(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1{S∞→1(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ S∞→1(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α

→ 1. 
The two rate conditions in the hypothesis of Theorem 2 are similar to those in the
hypothesis of Theorem 1. The first is that T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ → ∞ (or equivalently, that
S∞→1(F1, F2)/σ →∞). This condition implies that the size of the violation of H0 (as given
by T∞→1(F1, F2)) exceeds the magnitude of the test statistic under H0 (which is on the order
of σ) with high probability. When Ft is dense in the sense that for some s ∈ R, Fij,1(s) is
uniformly bounded away from 0 and 1, it also follows from
√
NT∞→1(F1, F2)→∞.
The second rate condition is that σ/
√
ln(N)→∞. This condition implies that that the
reference distribution generated by {S∞→1(Dr1, Dr2)}r∈[R] concentrates below σ. It is satisfied
if for some s ∈ R, N3
ln(N)
Fij,t(s) and
N3
ln(N)
(1−Fij,t(s)) are uniformly bounded away from 0. In
contrast to the hypothesis of Theorem 1, it is sufficient that agents have on expectation at
least ln(N)/N3 connections, which covers settings in which agents have a bounded number
of connections. In contrast to the second rate condition of Theorem 1, this second rate
condition is unlikely to be restrictive in practice.
Theorems 1 and 2 predict two scenarios in which the test based on the ∞ → 1 norm
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is potentially more powerful than that based on the 2 → 2 norm, in the sense that the
hypothesis of Theorem 2 is satisfied but that of Theorem 1 is not. The first scenario is under
network sparsity. An example of this is when F1∧(1−F1) and F2∧(1−F2) are uniformly on
the order of 1/N . One can verify in this case that τ/
√
ln(N)→ 0 but σ/√ln(N)→∞. The
second scenario is under degree-heterogeneity. An example of this is when, for some small
positive integer K, Fij,1 = Fij,2 is on the order of a constant if i∧j ≤ K but Fij,1 6= Fij,2 is on
the order of 1/
√
N when i∧j > K. Intuitively, the first K agents have an order of magnitude
more links than the other N−K agents. One can verify in this case that T2→2(F1, F2)/τ → 0
but T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ →∞.7 Simulation evidence supporting these predictions is provided in
Section 4.3.
4.2.3 Additional results
I supplement Theorems 1 and 2 with two additional results. The first result is that the rate
conditions T2→2(F1, F2)/τ → ∞ and T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ → ∞ are close to necessary. This is
made precise in the statement of Theorem 3 and is analogous to Theorem 14.2.3 of Lehmann
and Romano (2006), which demonstrates a similar result for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The second result is a weaker version of the consistency results of Theorems 1 and 2, given
by Theorem 4. The hypothesis of this theorem does not specify rate conditions that depend
on operator norms, and may be easier to interpret and apply in practice. I demonstrate its
use with the concrete example of Section 2.
Theorem 3: For any sequence of positive real numbers δN →∞
inf
F1,F2:δN [T2→2(F1,F2)/τ ]→∞
and τ/
√
ln(N)→∞
P

(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1{T2→2(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T2→2(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α

→ α
7Alternatively, the test based on the 2→ 2 norm is potentially more powerful under degree-heterogeneity
when the differences between F1 and F2 occur in a small number of high-variance rows. Even in this
case, making inferences based on a small number of high-variance observations (i.e. “outliers”) is not
recommended.
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and
inf
F1,F2:δN [T∞→1(F1,F2)/σ]→∞
and σ/
√
ln(N)→∞
P

(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1{S∞→1(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ S∞→1(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α

→ α. 
The statement of Theorem 3 differs from that of Theorems 1 and 2 in two ways. The
first is that the rate conditions in the subscript under the infima have been changed from
[T2→2(F1, F2)/τ ]→∞ and [T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ]→∞ to δN [T2→2(F1, F2)/τ ]→∞ and
δN [T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ]→∞ respectively. That is, the infima are taken over a (slightly) larger
class of sequences of in H1. The second difference is the conclusion: the power of the tests
no longer tend to one. In fact, the limiting power of the tests may be no greater than α.
To prove the theorem, the main work is in constructing a sequence of alternatives such that
T2→2(F1, F2)/τ → 0 slower than any given sequence, and T2→2(D1, D2) and T2→2(Dr1, Dr2)
converge to the same nondegenerate distribution. Intuitively, Theorem 3 states that the
tests proposed in Theorems 1 and 2 cannot detect differences between random graph models
that are too similar, in the sense that T2→2(F1, F2) or T∞→1(F1, F2) are too close to 0.
The second result is that under certain conditions the power of the tests from Theorems
1 and 2 tend to one whenever the difference between F1 and F2 is “regular” in the sense that
there exist two nontrivially sized subcommunities IN , JN ⊆ [N ] such that the probabilities
that any agent in IN links to any agent in JN all either increase or decrease with t.
Theorem 4: Suppose there exists IN , JN ⊆ [N ] with lim infN→∞ |IN |∧|JN |N > 0, s ∈ R, and
ρN > 0 such that for all i ∈ IN and j ∈ JN either (Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)) > ρN or
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)) < ρN . Then the power of the test from Theorem 1 converges to one if
ρNN/ ln(N)→∞. The power of the test from Theorem 2 converges to one if ρNN →∞. 
The benefit of Theorem 4 relative to Theorems 1 and 2 is that its hypothesis does not
use rate conditions that depend on operator norms. To illustrate its use, I sketch two
simple testing problems with models based on the concrete example from Section 2. Recall
for this example that Fij,t(s) = Gij,t(s − ft(αi,t, αj,t, wij,t)). Suppose for example that the
idiosyncratic errors are identically distributed for all agent-pairs and networks, the agent-
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pair attributes are the same for the two networks, and the community link function has
the form f(αi,t, αj,t, wij) = Λ(αi,t + αj,t + wijβ) for some unknown vector β and strictly
monotonic function Λ. Then the hypothesis of Theorem 4 is satisfied if there exists an IN
with lim infN→∞ IN/N > 0 such that |αi,1 − αi,2| > ρN for all i ∈ IN . That is, under these
conditions, the tests of Theorems 1 and 2 eventually (correctly) reject the null hypothesis
that the two networks have the same collection of agent-specific effects when it is false.
Alternatively, suppose that the idiosyncratic errors are identically distributed, the agent-
specific effects and agent-pair attributes are the same for the two networks, and the commu-
nity link function has the form ft(αi, αj, wij) = Λt(αi, αj)+wijβ for some functions {Λt}t∈[2]
and vector β. Then the hypothesis of Theorem 4 is satisfied if Λ1(αi, αj) and Λ2(αi, αj)
disagree on IN × JN with lim infN→∞(IN ∧ JN)/N > 0. That is, under these conditions, the
tests from Theorems 1 and 2 eventually (correctly) reject the null hypothesis that the two
networks have the same community link function when it is false.
4.2.4 Two key lemmas
Proofs of Theorems 1-4 can be found in the appendix. They rely on bounds for the refer-
ence distributions generated by {T2→2(Dr1, Dr2)}r∈[R] and {S∞→1(Dr1, Dr2)}r∈[R], although the
lemmas in the appendix are stated and proved for an arbitrary collection of matrices with
independent, bounded, and mean-zero entries.
Lemma 1: For any fixed α ∈ [0, 1] with probability at least 1− α
τˆ ≤ max
r∈[R]
T2→2(Dr1, D
r
2) ≤ C2→2τ +O
(√
ln(N) +
√
ln(R/α)
)
where τˆ = maxs∈Rmaxi∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]∆ij(s)
2. 
Lemma 2: For any fixed α ∈ [0, 1] with probability at least 1− α
σˆ ≤ max
r∈[R]
S∞→1(Dr1, D
r
2) ≤ C∞→1σ +O
(√
ln(N) +
√
ln(R/α)
)
where σˆ = maxs∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]∆ij(s)
2. 
25
Specifically, the lemmas hold for C2→2 > 2 and C∞→1 > πln(1+√2) > 3.57. They demon-
strate that the reference distributions for T2→2 and S∞→1 generated by randomly exchanging
the corresponding entries of the two adjacency matrices are highly likely to be on the order
of magnitude of τ and σ no matter the underlying F1 and F2. The upper bounds follow from
the general recipe for bounding operator norms of random matrices specified in Chapter 2.3
of Tao (2012). The first step is to apply a variant of Talagrand’s inequality (see Boucheron,
Lugosi, and Massart 2013, Corollary 6.10) to bound the variation of these statistics around
their expectation. The second step is to bound the expectations using results from Bandeira
and Van Handel (2016) and Gittens and Tropp (2009).8 Related arguments are also used
recently by Moon (2019). The corresponding lower bound for maxr∈[R] T2→2(Dr1, D
r
2) has
been known to the random matrix theory literature for some time. To my knowledge, the
bound on maxr∈[R] S∞→1(Dr1, D
r
2) is original.
4.3 Simulation evidence
Section 4.2.2 predicts that the test based on the ∞ → 1 norm is potentially more powerful
than that based on the 2 → 2 norm for sparse and degree-heterogeneous alternatives. This
subsection provides supporting evidence from two Monte Carlo experiments. It considers
the case of unweighted unipartite networks with no loops (symmetric, binary, and hollow
adjacency matrices) for simplicity. The purpose of this section is not to simulate data that
mimics real-world networks (see instead Section 5), but rather to assess the predictions in
a controlled environment. Other simulations (not reported) yielded qualitatively identical
results.
4.3.1 The sparse experiment
Sparsity is a common feature of social and economic networks. For example, in many social
surveys it is common for agents to report less than a dozen connections. To examine the
impact of network sparsity on the power of the two tests, I consider two Erdo¨s-Renyi graph
models. In these models, the adjacency matrices are {0, 1}-valued with P (Dij,t = 1) =
8Both steps can be modified to allow for many types of link dependence as suggested in Section 2.3,
Example 1 (see Vershynin 2010, for an example).
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1 − Fij,1(0) = 8N and 1 − Fij,2(0) = 5N for every i, j ∈ [N ]. Agents in the first network have
approximately 60% more links than agents in the second network, violating H0. Applying
the two tests to data simulated from the models with N = 50/100 and R = 10000 yields an
average p-value for the test based on the 2→ 2 norm of approximately 0.070/0.020 and an
average p-value for the test based on the ∞ → 1 norm of approximately 0.049/0.013. The
test based on the ∞→ 1 norm is clearly more powerful, but not dramatically so.
4.3.2 The degree heterogeneity experiment
Degree heterogeneity is another common feature of social and economic networks. For exam-
ple, in many production and collaboration networks it is common for a small number of agents
to have an order of magnitude more links than the median agent. To examine the impact
of degree heterogeneity on the power of the two tests, I consider two second-order stochastic
blockmodels. In these models, P (Dij,t = 1) = 1 − Fij,t(0), with F1j,1(0) = F1j,2(0) = .5 for
all j ∈ [N ] and 1 − Fij,1(0) = .02 and 1 − Fij,2(0) = .08 for any i, j ∈ [N ] \ [1]. Agents in
the first network have approximately 400% percent more links than in the second network,
violating H0. However, the high degree agent, agent 1, has approximately the same number
of links. Applying the two tests to data simulated from the models with N = 50/100 and
R = 10000 yields an average p-value for the test based on the 2→ 2 norm of approximately
0.521/0.204 and an average p-value for the test based on the ∞→ 1 norm of approximately
0.001/0.000. The test based on the ∞→ 1 norm appears to be substantially more powerful.
5 Two empirical demonstrations
I provide two empirical demonstrations using publicly available data. The first demonstration
is about measuring a change in network structure over time. A sample of high school
students are surveyed annually about their social connections. The networks appear to be
less connected and more clustered over time, perhaps because the students place increasing
value on having friends in common as they age. The problem is to test whether the observed
changes in the reported relationships can be explained by the same random graph model. In
this demonstration one can think of the age of the students as the “treatment” and the null
27
Table 1: Glasgow Social Network Descriptive Statistics
Agent Eigenvector Clustering Diameter
Degree Centrality Coefficient
First
Wave
Mean 3.49 0.09 0.35 14
SD 1.69 0.20
Third
Wave
Mean 3.64 0.07 0.42 20
SD 1.80 0.21
This table compares two social networks surveyed from 135 Scottish secondary students in the “Teenage
Friends and Lifestyle Study.” Two students are linked if one student reports being friends or best friends
with the other. The First Wave corresponds to all the links reported in the first survey and the Third
Wave corresponds to all of the links in the third survey. It describes the means and standard deviations for
four measures of network structure: the sequence of agent degrees, eigenvector centralities, clustering
coefficients, and diameters of the largest connected component.
hypothesis as the definition of “no treatment effects.”
The data comes from the “Teenage Friends and Lifestyle Study” (see Michell and West
1996) in which the researchers survey 160 Scottish students about friendship links during
their second, third, and fourth years of secondary school.9 This example uses the social
network surveyed from the first and third waves when the students are respectively 13 and
15 years old. Only students who appear in all three waves are included, yielding a final
sample size of N = 135.
Descriptive statistics about the two networks are provided in Table 1. These statistics
are often used in the economics literature to characterize network structure (see Jackson
2008, Chapter 2). Specifically, the table describes the means and standard deviations of four
measures of network structure: the sequence of agent degrees {∑j∈[N ]Dij}i∈[N ], eigenvector
centralities, clustering coefficients
∑
i,j,k∈[N] DijDikDjk∑
i,j,k∈[N] DijDik
, and diameters of the largest connected
component. The last two measures are scalars and so standard deviations are not reported.
The table indicates that while the total number of links appear to be roughly the same for
9The data can be found at https://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/~snijders/siena/Glasgow_data.htm and is
similar in spirit to though considerably less comprehensive than the restricted-use National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent to Adult Health dataset commonly used to study peer effects in economics.
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Table 2: Glasgow Network Test Results
Average Agent Eigenvector Clustering Diameter 2→ 2 ∞→ 1
R = 10000 Degree Degree Centrality Coefficient Norm Norm
p-value
0.50 0.89 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01
This table compares two social networks surveyed from 135 Scottish secondary students in the “Teenage
Friends and Lifestyle Study.” Two students are linked if one student reports being friends or best friends
with the other. The two social networks compared correspond to the collections of links surveyed in the
first and third waves of the study. It describes p-values for tests based on the absolute difference in average
degree, the mean squared difference in agent degrees, the mean squared difference in eigenvector
centralities, absolute difference in clustering coefficients, absolute difference in diameters, 2→ 2 norm of
the entry-wise differences between the two networks’ adjacency matrices, and semidefinite approximation
to the ∞→ 1 norm of the entry-wise differences between the two networks’ adjacency matrices.
both networks, the second network is less interconnected than the first network (as measured
by the eigenvector centrality, clustering, and diameter statistics). That these differences are
unlikely to be generated by the same random graph model is demonstrated in Table 2.
Table 2 reports the p-value of the randomization test proposed in Section 3 using seven
test statistics. Specifically, it reports the p-value
(R + 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1 {T (D1,r, D2,r) ≥ T (D1, D2)}

 .
Each column of the table contains the p-value associated with one of the seven test statistics.
The first five test statistics are the absolute difference in average degree, the mean squared
difference in agent degrees, the mean squared difference in eigenvector centralities, absolute
difference in clustering coefficients, and absolute difference in diameters of the two networks.
The last two test statistics are T2→2 and S∞→1 as defined in Section 4.1. Table 2 indicates
that the large differences in the clustering and diameters between the two networks are
unlikely to be generated by the same random graph model, but this difference would not be
detected using the tests based on degree or eigenvector centrality. The implausibility of the
null hypothesis is clearly indicated by the tests based on T2→2 and S∞→1.
The second demonstration is about comparing networks generated by different survey
questions. A sample of households in a village are surveyed about multiple types of relation-
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Table 3: India Social and Economic Network Descriptive Statistics
Agent Eigenvector Clustering Diameter
Degree Centrality Coefficient
Social
Network
Mean 3.92 0.26 0.13 6
SD 3.17 0.22
Economic
Network
Mean 4.94 0.27 0.19 5
SD 3.65 0.21
This table compares two social networks from village 10 in Banerjee et al. (2013). Two agents are linked in
the first network if they “engage socially” and linked in the second if they “borrow or lend money, rice, or
kerosene.” It describes the means and standard deviations for four measures of network structure: the
sequence of agent degrees, eigenvector centralities, clustering coefficients, and diameters of the largest
connected component.
ships. The researcher hypothesizes that these survey questions provide the same information
about the underlying interactions between agents, so that the researcher may treat them as
interchangeable for the purposes of estimating treatment spillovers or modeling information
diffusion. In other words, the differences between the networks can be explained by the same
random graph model. This is, for example, a key assumption made by Banerjee et al. (2013).
The data for this demonstration comes from Banerjee et al. (2013), in which the re-
searchers survey information about a dozen social and economic connections between house-
holds for 75 villages in rural India.10 This demonstration uses data from the N = 77
households in village 10 and compares the social network in which two households are linked
if a member of one of the households indicates that they “engage socially” with a member of
the other household to the economic network in which two households are linked if a member
of one of the households indicates that they “borrow money from,” “borrow kerosene or rice
from,” “lend kerosene or rice to,” or lend money to” a member of the other household. Table
3 contains the same summary statistics for the two networks as given in Table 1.
Table 3 describes two key differences between the social and economic networks. The
first difference is that the surveyed households have (on average) approximately one more
10The data can be found at https://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/21538.
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Table 4: India Network Test Results
Average Agent Eigenvector Clustering Diameter 2→ 2 ∞→ 1
R = 10000 Degree Degree Centrality Coefficient Norm Norm
p-value
0.00 0.58 0.73 0.05 0.55 0.25 0.05
This table compares two social networks from village 10 in Banerjee et al. (2013). Two agents are linked in
the first network if they “engage socially” and linked in the second if they “borrow or lend money, rice, or
kerosene.” It describes p-values for tests based on the absolute difference in average degree, the mean
squared difference in agent degrees, the mean squared difference in eigenvector centralities, absolute
difference in clustering coefficients, absolute difference in diameters, 2→ 2 norm of the entry-wise
differences between the two networks’ adjacency matrices, and semidefinite approximation to the ∞→ 1
norm of the entry-wise differences between the two networks’ adjacency matrices.
economic link than social link (five instead of four links). The second difference is that
there is more clustering in the economic network. Table 4 below demonstrates that these
differences are unlikely to be explained by the same random graph model.
Table 4 contains the same information as Table 2 but for the Banerjee et al. (2013)
data. It indicates that the differences between the average degrees and clustering coefficients
of the two networks are unlikely to be explained by the null hypothesis. However, this
difference would not be detected by a reasonably-sized test based on the 2→ 2 norm because
T2→2(D1, D2) is in roughly the third quartile of its reference distribution. On the other hand,
S∞→1 is firmly in the upper decile of its reference distribution, and so this test statistic
provides more evidence against the null hypothesis.
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A Proofs
A.1 Theorem 1
Proof of Lemma 1: Let X be an arbitrary N ×N dimensional matrix. The lower bound follows from
max
ϕ∈SN
∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj


2
≥ max
ϕ∈EN
∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj


2
= max
j∈[N ]
∑
i∈[N ]
X2ij
where SN is the N -dimensional hypersphere {ϕ ∈ RN :∑t∈[N ] ϕ2t = 1}, EN is the usual set of basis vectors
in RN {ϕ ∈ RN :∑t∈[N ] ϕ2t =∑t∈[N ] |ϕj | = 1}, and the inequality follows from EN ⊂ SN . Consequently, if
{Xs}s∈S is any collection of N ×N dimensional matrices indexed by a set S then
max
s∈S
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xij,sϕj


2
≥ max
s∈S
max
j∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ]
X2ij,s
where Xij,s is the ijth entry of the matrix Xs.
The upper bound follows inequalities by Talagrand (see Boucheron, Lugosi, and Massart 2013, Theorem
6.10) and Bandeira and Van Handel (2016). Specifically, let X be an N ×N dimensional random
symmetric matrix with independent and mean-zero entries above the diagonal and zeros on the main
diagonal. The entries of X are absolutely bounded by 1. Then for any ε > 0, Talagrand’s inequality implies
P

maxϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj


2
− E

maxϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj


2

 > ε

 ≤ exp (−ε2/2) .
since maxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈[N ]
(∑
j∈[N ]Xijϕj
)2
is convex in X by the triangle inequality.
Corollary 3.2 to Theorem 1.1 of Bandeira and Van Handel (2016) implies
E

maxϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj


2

 ≤ (1 + γ)

2 max
j∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ]
E
[
X2ij
]
+
6√
ln(1 + γ)
√
ln(N)


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for any γ ∈ [0, 1/2]. Consequently, for any real positive integer S, collection of N ×N dimensional random
symmetric matrices {Xs}s∈[S] such that each matrix Xs satisfies the above conditions, and γ ∈ [0, 1/2]
max
s∈[S]
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj


2
> ε+ (1 + γ)2max
s∈[S]
max
j∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ]
E
[
X2ij,s
]
+
6(1 + γ)√
ln(1 + γ)
√
ln(N)
with probability less than S exp
(−ε2/2) by the union bound. Or equivalently, for any α ∈ [0, 1] and
γ ∈ [0, 1/2]
max
s∈[S]
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj


2
≤
√
−2 ln
(α
S
)
+ (1 + γ)2max
s∈[S]
max
j∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ]
E
[
X2ij,s
]
+
6(1 + γ)√
ln(1 + γ)
√
ln(N)
with probability greater than 1− α. The claim follows. 
Proof of Theorem 1: By two applications of the triangle inequality,
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj


2
≥ max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕj


2
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − Fij,1(s)
)
ϕj


2
+max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,2≤s − Fij,2(s)
)
ϕj


2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Since {1Dr
1
≤s − 1Dr
2
≤s}s∈R,r∈[R] is a collection of no more than RN(N − 1) unique N ×N dimensional
random symmetric matrices with independent and mean-zero entries above the diagonal and zeros on the
main diagonal, all absolutely bounded by 1, then Lemma 1 implies that for any α ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1/2]
max
r∈[R]
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj


2
≤
√
−2 ln
(
α
RN(N − 1)
)
+ (1 + γ)2max
s∈[R]
max
j∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ]
νij(s) +
6(1 + γ)√
ln(1 + γ)
√
ln(N)
with probability greater than 1− α, where νij(s) = [Fij,1(s) + Fij,2(s)− 2Fij,1(s)Fij,2(s)]. Since
√
− ln(α) + ln(R) + ln(N)
maxs∈[S]maxj∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ] νij(s)
→ 0
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by Assumption 2 and the rate condition τ/
√
ln(N)→∞,
maxr∈[R]maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈[N ]
(∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj
)2
maxs∈[R]maxj∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ] νij(s)
= Op(1).
The matrices {1Dt≤s − Ft(s)}s∈R,t∈{1,2} also satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 1, and so too
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − Fij,1(s)
)
ϕj


2
+max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,2≤s − Fij,2(s)
)
ϕj


2
= Op

max
s∈[S]
max
j∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ]
νij(s)

 .
The rate condition T2→2(F1, F2)/τ →∞ then implies
maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈[N ]
(∑
j∈[N ] (Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕj
)2
maxs∈[R]maxj∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ] νij(s)
→∞
so
maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈[N ]
(∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj
)2
maxs∈[S]maxj∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ] νij(s)
→∞
and thus
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj


2
≥ max
r∈[R]
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj


2
eventually. The claim follows. 
A.2 Theorem 2
The proof of Lemma 2 relies on the following inequality due to Grothendieck and Krivine (1979).
Theorem (Grothendieck): Let X be an arbitrary N ×N dimensional real matrix such that
max
ϕ,ψ∈RN :||ϕ||∞,||ψ||∞≤1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕjψi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1.
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Then
max
ϕ,ψ∈H:||ϕ||H,||ψ||H≤1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xij < ϕ˜i, ψ˜j >H
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K =
pi
2 ln
(
1 +
√
2
) ≤ 1.783
where H is an arbitrary Hilbert space and || · ||H and < ·, · >H are the associated norm and inner product
operators.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let X be an arbitrary N ×N dimensional matrix. The lower bound then follows from
K max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = K maxϕ,ψ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕjψi ≥ max
ϕ,ψ∈MN
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xij
∑
s∈[N ]
ϕjsψis
≥
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xij
∑
s∈[N ]
Xis√∑
s∈[N ]X
2
is
1{j = s} =
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
X2ij
where CN is the N -dimensional hypercube {−1, 1}N , MN is the set of N ×N matrices with rows of
Euclidean length 1 {Λ ∈ RN×N :∑Nj=1 Λ2ij = 1∀i ∈ [N ]}, and the first inequality is due to Grothendieck.
Consequently, if {Xs}s∈S is any collection of N ×N dimensional matrices indexed by a set S then
Kmax
s∈S
max
ϕ,ψ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xij,sϕjψi ≥ max
s∈S
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
X2ij,s
where Xij,s is the ijth entry of matrix Xs.
The upper bound also follows from Talagrand’s inequality and an inequality due to Gittens and Tropp
(2009). Specifically, let X be an N ×N dimensional random symmetric matrix with independent and
mean-zero entries above the diagonal and zeros on the main diagonal. The entries of X are absolutely
bounded by 1. Then for any ε > 0, Talagrand’s inequality implies
P

max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣− E

max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 > ε

 ≤ exp (−ε2/2) .
since maxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∑j∈[N ]Xijϕj ∣∣∣ is convex in X by the triangle inequality.
Corollary 2 to Theorem 3 of Gittens and Tropp (2009) implies
E

max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 ≤ 2 ∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
E
[
X2ij
]
.
Consequently, for any real positive integer S and collection of N ×N dimensional random symmetric
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matrices {Xs}s∈[S] such that each matrix Xs satisfies the above conditions
max
s∈[S]
max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
Xij,sϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ε+ 2maxs∈[S]
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
E
[
X2ij,s
]
with probability less than S exp
(−ε2/2) by the union bound. So for any α ∈ [0, 1]
max
s∈[S]
max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
Xij,sϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
−2 ln
(α
S
)
+ 2max
s∈[S]
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
E
[
X2ij,s
]
with probability greater than 1− α. The claim follows. 
Proof of Theorem 2: By two applications of the triangle inequality,
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ maxs∈R maxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣maxs∈R maxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − Fij,1(s)
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣+maxs∈R maxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,2≤s − Fij,2(s)
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Since {1Dr
1
≤s − 1Dr
2
≤s}s∈R,r∈[R] is a collection of no more than RN(N − 1) unique N ×N dimensional
random symmetric matrices with independent and mean-zero entries above the diagonal and zeros on the
main diagonal, all absolutely bounded by 1, then Lemma 2 implies that for any α ∈ [0, 1]
max
r∈[R]
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
−2 ln
(
α
RN(N − 1)
)
+ 2max
s∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
νij(s)
with probability greater than 1− α where νij(s) = [Fij,1(s) + Fij,2(s)− 2Fij,1(s)Fij,2(s)]. Since
− ln(α) + ln(R) + ln(N)
maxs∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ] νij(s)
→ 0
by Assumption 2 and the rate condition σ/
√
ln(N)→∞,
maxr∈[R]maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∑j∈[N ] (1Drij,1≤s − 1Drij,2≤s)ϕj
∣∣∣
maxs∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ] νij(s)
= Op(1).
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The matrices {1Dt≤s − Ft(s)}s∈R,t∈{1,2} also satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 2, and so too
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − Fij,1(s)
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣+maxs∈R maxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,2≤s − Fij,2(s)
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= Op

max
s∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
νij(s)

 .
The rate condition T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ →∞ then implies
maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∑j∈[N ] (Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕj∣∣∣
maxs∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ] νij(s)
→∞
so
maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∑j∈[N ] (1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s)ϕj∣∣∣
maxs∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ] νij(s)
→∞
and thus
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ maxr∈[R]maxs∈R maxϕ∈CN
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
eventually. The claim follows. 
A.3 Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3: I demonstrate the claim for the test based on the 2→ 2 norm since the proof of
that based on the ∞→ 1 norm is identical. The proof is constructive in that, for any sequence δN →∞, it
specifies a specific sequence of distribution function matrices F1 and F2, depending on δN , such that
δNT2→2(F1, F2)/τ →∞ or
δN
maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈[N ]
(∑
j∈[N ] (Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕj
)2
maxs∈[S]maxj∈[N ]
√∑
i∈[N ] [Fij,1(s) + Fij,2(s)− 2Fij,1(s)Fij,2(s)]
→∞
and
P

(R+ 1)−1

1 + ∑
r∈[R]
1{T2→2(Dr1, Dr2) ≥ T2→2(D1, D2)}

 ≤ α

→ α.
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The proof has three steps. The first step is to specify F1 and F2. For an arbitrary ε > 0, define
A1−ε = [⌈(1− ε)N⌉] and Aε = [N ] \A1−ε. That is, let A1−ε index the first ⌈(1− ε)N⌉ agents in the
sample and Aε the last ⌊εN⌋. Suppose Fij,1 = Fij,2 for i, j ∈ A1−ε with Fij,1 and Fij,2 uniformly bounded
away from 0 and 1, Fij,1 = Fij,2 = 0 for i ∈ Aε and j ∈ A1−ε (or i ∈ A1−ε and j ∈ Aε), and Fij,1 = 1+Fij,2
for i, j ∈ Aε.
The second step is to fix ε = (δNN)
−1/2. Note that since T2→2 is O (Nε) and τ is O(
√
N) by construction
from the first step, it follows that T2→2(F1, F2)/τ → 0, but δNT2→2(F1, F2)/τ →∞.
The third step is then to apply the triangle inequality twice. The first application gives
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj


2
≥ max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√ ∑
i∈A1−ε

 ∑
j∈A1−ε
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj


2
−max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈Aε

∑
j∈Aε
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj


2
.
The second application gives
max
r∈[R]
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj


2
≤ max
r∈[R]
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√ ∑
i∈A1−ε

 ∑
j∈A1−ε
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj


2
+ max
r∈[R]
max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈SN
√√√√√∑
i∈Aε

∑
j∈Aε
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj


2
.
Both maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈Aε
(∑
j∈Aε
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj
)2
and
maxr∈[R]maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈Aε
(∑
j∈Aε
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj
)2
are bounded by Nε by
construction and thus are o
(√
N
)
by the second step. On the other hand,
maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈A1−ε
(∑
j∈A1−ε
(
1Dij,1≤s − 1Dij,2≤s
)
ϕj
)2
/
√
N and
maxr∈[R]maxs∈Rmaxϕ∈SN
√∑
i∈A1−ε
(∑
j∈A1−ε
(
1Dr
ij,1
≤s − 1Dr
ij,2
≤s
)
ϕj
)2
/
√
N are bounded away from 0
by the lower bound in Lemma 1. Since these two are identically distributed and nondegenerate by
construction, the result follows. 
43
A.4 Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4: The claim is proven by checking the hypotheses of Theorems 1 and 2. This is done
in three steps. The first step is to demonstrate that the assumption that there exists IN , JN ⊆ [N ] with
lim infN→∞
|IN |∧|JN |
N > 0 and ρN > 0 such that for all i ∈ IN , j ∈ JN there exists s such that
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)) > ρN or (Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)) < ρN implies that T2→2(F1, F2) ≥ ρNN and
T∞→1(F1, F2) ≥ ρNN2 eventually (N →∞). Write δ = lim infN→∞ |IN |∧|JN |N > 0. Then
T2→2(F1, F2) = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||2=1

∑
i∈[N ]

∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕj


2


1/2
≥

∑
i∈IN

∑
j∈JN
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))√∑
j∈JN
1


2


1/2
≥ ρNNδ2
eventually and
T∞→1(ρNF1, ρNF2) = max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||∞=1
∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)ϕj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= max
s∈R
max
ϕ:||ϕ||∞=1
max
ψ:||ψ||∞=1
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕjψi
≥ max
s∈R
max
ϕ∈{0,1}N
max
ψ∈{0,1}N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))ϕjψi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ max
s∈R
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈IN
∑
j∈JN
(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ρNN2δ2
eventually where the first inequality follows from the fact that for any N ×N dimensional matrix X
max
ϕ∈{0,1}N
max
ψ∈{0,1}N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕjψi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = maxϕ∈{−1,1}N maxψ∈{−1,1}N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xij
(
ϕj + 1
2
)(
ψi + 1
2
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
= max
ϕ∈{−1,1}N
max
ψ∈{−1,1}N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
[Xijϕjψi +Xij +Xijϕj +Xijψi] /4
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
ϕ∈{−1,1}N
max
ψ∈{−1,1}N
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕjψi = max
ϕ:||ϕ||∞=1
max
ψ:||ψ||∞=1
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[N ]
Xijϕjψi.
where the last inequality follows from distributing the maximzation over the sum.
The second step is to observe that the assumption that there exists IN , JN ⊆ [N ] with
lim infN→∞
|IN |∧|JN |
N > 0 and ρN > 0 such that for all i ∈ IN , j ∈ JN there exists s such that
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(Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)) > ρN or (Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)) < ρN implies that
δ
√
ρNN ≤ τ ≤
√
2
√
ρNN and δ
√
ρNN3 ≤ σ ≤
√
2
√
ρNN3
eventually. Without loss of generality suppose that (Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)) > ρN . The two upper bounds then
follow from the fact that Fij,t(s) is bounded in [0, 1]. The first lower bound follows from
τ = max
s∈R
max
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s) + Fij,2(s)− 2Fij,1(s)Fij,2(s))
≥ max
s∈R
max
i∈IN
√∑
j∈JN
([Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)] + 2Fij,2(s)(1 − Fij,1(s)))
and the fact that 2Fij,2(s)(1− Fij,1(s)) is not negative. Similarly
σ = max
s∈R
∑
i∈[N ]
√∑
j∈[N ]
(Fij,1(s) + Fij,2(s)− 2Fij,1(s)Fij,2(s))
≥ max
s∈R
∑
i∈IN
√∑
j∈JN
([Fij,1(s)− Fij,2(s)] + 2Fij,2(s)(1 − Fij,1(s)))
implies the second lower bound.
The third step is to observe that steps 1 and 2 imply that
T2→2(F1, F2)/τ ≥
√
ρNNδ
2/
√
2 and T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ ≥
√
ρNNδ
2/
√
2
eventually so that T2→2(F1, F2)/τ →∞ and T∞→1(F1, F2)/σ →∞ so long as ρNN →∞. Since
σ/
√
ln(N) ≥ δ
√
ρNN3/ ln(N)
eventually, ρNN →∞ also implies that σ/
√
ln(N)→∞ and so the hypothesis of Theorem 2 is satisfied.
Since
τ/
√
ln(N) ≥ δ
√
ρNN/ ln(N),
eventually, strengthening the rate condition to ρNN/ ln(N)→∞ implies that τ/
√
ln(N)→∞ so that the
hypothesis of Theorem 1 is also satisfied. This demonstrates the proof. 
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